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I. Introduction
1. The food supply chain is generally depicted as composed by three main levels: 
agricultural production, industrial processing and wholesale or retail distribution. 
At a closer look, however, the food supply chain becomes more complex, involving 
a number of other stages and links that add value to the chain either in the form 
of goods or services inputs. The food industry is heavily dependent on scarce 
resources like arable land, water and genetic resources (a limited biodiversity). 
At each level of the supply chain, firms as well as other organizational forms 
perform specific activities supplying goods or services. Moreover, at the same level 
there may be one or more firms performing the same or complementary activities, 
adding specific value at their stage of activity. The food supply chain, as a whole, 
originates before the agricultural sector, with the factor market (for example the 
seed provider) and ends with the final consumer. The power relations in the global 
food value chain are characterized by international actors and local producers 
operating within the geographic area determined by the logistics of the product. 
Issues of distribution of the total surplus value of the global food chain are thus 
paramount and should inevitably influence competition law enforcement.
AbstrAct
The paper explores the competition dynamics 
of the global seed market. It documents 
the growth strategies of the major seed 
companies, in particular their M&A activity and 
their reliance on complex intellectual property 
strategies in order to offer a one stop shop 
solution to farmers. Recent merger activity in 
this sector (the Monsanto bid to buy Syngenta, 
the DuPont and Dow merger deal, ChemChina’s 
bid to buy Syngenta) illustrates its rapid 
transformation from an already concentrated 
industry to a tight oligopoly on a global scale. 
The increasing global consolidation of this 
industry raises new challenges for competition 
law enforcement authorities dealing with 
the emergence of new powerful actors at 
the factor of production (input) level, in view of 
the broader concerns animating public policy 
in the food sector and the existence of a nexus 
of international commitments for biodiversity, 
sustainability, the right to food etc. By 
exploring this under-studied but fascinating 
area of competition law enforcement we open 
the debate over the inclusion of broader public 
interest concerns in competition policy and the 
consideration of its distributive impact from a 
global perspective.
Cet article étudie les dynamiques 
concurrentielles du marché mondial 
des semences. Il développe les évolutions 
stratégiques des principales entreprises 
dans ce secteur, notamment au regard de leur 
activité de fusions-acquisitions et leur 
dépendance aux stratégies complexes liées à la 
propriété intellectuelle qui visent à offrir une 
solution de guichet unique aux agriculteurs. 
L’activité récente en matière de contrôle des 
concentrations dans ce secteur (l’offre d’achat 
de Monsanto envers Syngenta, la fusion de 
DuPont et Dow, l’offre d’achat de ChemChina 
envers Syngenta) illustre sa transformation 
rapide passant d’une industrie déjà concentrée 
à un oligopole restreint à l’échelle mondiale. 
L’augmentation de la concentration mondiale 
dans cette industrie fait apparaître de nouveaux 
défis pour la mise en œuvre du droit de la 
concurrence par les autorités de concurrence 
qui ont à traiter de l’émergence de nouveaux 
acteurs puissants au stade de la production, 
tout en tenant compte de considérations plus 
larges de politique publique fortement liée, 
dans le secteur alimentaire, 
par les engagements internationaux 
pour la protection de la biodiversité, 
un développement durable, le droit 
à l’alimentation, etc. En étudiant ce champ 
encore peu étudié, mais pour le moins 
fascinant, de la mise en œuvre du droit de 
la concurrence sur le marché des semences, 
les auteurs de cet article ouvrent un débat sur 
la prise en compte de considérations d’intérêt 
public plus larges en matière de politique de 
concurrence et sur l’impact que cela peut avoir 
en matière de redistribution à l’échelle mondiale.
Article
Voir aussi sur
Concurrences +
www.concurrences.com
Incitations aux répara-
tions spontanées dans 
le cadre du public 
enforcement”
Catherine Prieto
“
*  The authors would like to thank Matthew Jay Strader and Spencer Weber Waller for comments on earlier versions of this 
study. The authors are responsible for any errors or omissions. Ce
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2.  This study’s focus is on the upper segment of the 
market—that of the factors of production, and in 
particular seed players, and their relations with the 
other segments of the value chain—i.e. farmers. Global 
seed producers (Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, Pioneer, 
BASF, etc.) continue to increase their global presence in 
the “seed chain” and have recently acquired critical market 
influence in key food exporting regions.1 Combined 
with the natural complexity of global food production-
supply chains, any disruption in seeds supply may cause 
a systemic food shock of a global magnitude. There have 
also been some significant changes at the upstream level 
of the food value supply chain which reinforce the power 
these global seed players exercise over a significant part 
of the global food value chain. 
3. First, these players develop intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) strategies in order to reinforce their dominance 
towards farmers, capturing the significant part of the 
value added along the whole food pipeline. Agriculture 
has become increasingly technology driven (biotech, crop 
protection, microbial solutions, big data and analytics 
software). In the current value chain context, to remain 
competitive and to stay in business, farmers have to adapt 
the latest technologies from the global factors providers, 
who use intellectual property protection or big data as 
a bargaining tool in their relations with farmers. This 
makes farmers critically dependent on global agriculture 
technology providers and may lead to the development of 
bottlenecks. Farmers’ labor is increasingly commoditized 
causing social tensions, in particular in emergent 
economies and the developing world. Competition law 
is seen in some quarters as a possible response to this 
increasing power of global seed platforms. 
4.  Second, the development of new technologies has 
led to the emergence of a diverse group of players: crop 
protection and seed companies, equipment companies, 
fertilizer companies, retail distributors, and pure-play 
digital start-ups. These seek to develop an “integrated 
offering of equipment and services for farmers,” enabling 
them to “gradually build a compelling one-stop solution 
that will allow them to compete for the lion’s share of 
the market.”2 Consequently, these companies develop 
strategies in order to acquire new capabilities and exploit 
different sources of revenue by “applying new technology 
1 The “seed chain” consists of three basic components: “research and plant 
breeding; seed multiplication; and marketing and distribution”: N. P. Louwaars 
et al., Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights Regimes on the Plant 
Breeding Industry in Developing Countries – A Synthesis of Five Case Studies, 
(World Bank Report, February 2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/ 
resources/docs/LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05.pdf, pp. 28–29 (noting the 
differences between developed and developing countries in the way the 
different components of the industry are structured. Seed multiplication, 
marketing, and distribution are essentially considered a commercial operation 
in developed countries, with research and plant breeding essentially carried 
out by commercial enterprises, in particular for high value seed crops, like 
maize, cotton, soybean, vegetables. In developing countries research and 
plant breeding is essentially carried out by the broader public or “parastatal” 
sector, or farmers’ themselves (farmers’ seed systems), while the other 
operations are considered more as vehicles for technology transfer rather than 
a commercial operation).
2 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 – The Reinvention of the Sector, 
(April 2015), available at https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/ 
process-industries-innovation-crop-farming-2030-reinvention-sector, p. 10.
or by expanding across the value chain or geographically.”3 
This is achieved by significant merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity, leading to higher levels of concentration 
on several markets. Market players therefore have made 
the choice of positioning themselves as fully integrated 
providers, or the orchestrators of a network, or partners 
of an established network,4 which may lead to the 
development of bottlenecks in the food supply chain 
affecting consumers and other market actors, such as 
farmers. 
5.  The competition authorities in the U.S. and Europe 
were, so far, mostly supportive to this trend of economic 
concentration, which took different forms, such as 
corporate mergers, joint research enterprises and patent 
pools created by the leading global seed companies. 
This  policy approach is primarily based on the theory 
that such concentration will increase innovation (probably 
espousing the Schumpeterian argument about innovation 
in this sector5), while not much attention is paid to 
the consequences such concentration may entail for 
the operation of the global food value chain as a whole, 
the power relations between the seed companies and other 
economic actors down the chain, as well as the incentive 
and ability of these other economic actors to innovate. 
The global value chain approach helps us understand the 
competitive interactions in the area from a different angle.6 
6. We will first explore these dynamics by examining the 
role of IP rights in the development of the industry and 
the way the significant M&A activity played out in the 
structure of the industry. We will then delve into the 
competitive strategy of seed platforms and the likely 
development of the industry in the near future. Finally, 
we will examine how this new configuration may be of 
relevance to competition law enforcement and more 
generally the response of competition authorities, which 
has been quite timid so far in this economic sector.
II. The expansion 
of intellectual 
property rights in 
the food value chain
7. Historically, plant and seed material were regarded as 
communal resources to be freely shared. Farmers were 
incentivized to save, replant, and resell seeds to other 
3 Ibid., p. 12.
4 Ibid., p. 15.
5 For the classic question of the appropriate market structure for innovation, see 
P. Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 
(2005) 120(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 701–728.
6 On the global value chain approach, see, inter alia, G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey 
and T. Sturgeon, The Governance of Global Value Chains, (2005) 12 Review 
of International Political Economy 78. Ce
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farmers, the dominant paradigm for trait development 
being farmer sharing.7 Starting with the mechanization 
and the use of tractors in the late 19th  century and 
most recently with the granting of the first plant 
biotechnology patent in 1992, IP rights have long been 
used in the agricultural sector in order to stimulate 
R&D and innovation. They also formed the basis for 
the emergence of a private seed industry following the 
Green revolution of the 1960s-1970s. Initially funded 
by the public sector, the Green revolution led to an 
important increase of productivity at a higher cost for 
the independence of farmers that have until then ensured 
the effort of innovation in the sector by developing 
crop diversity (a decentralized and highly fragmented 
innovation environment).8 Farmers became dependent 
on external seeds, which led to the emergence of a private 
seed market. The new varieties introduced by the Green 
revolution also required sharp increases in the use of 
fertilizers and pesticides, which added to the dependence 
of farmers on the private market and increased the need 
for credit. The development of biotech and genetic 
engineering in the 1990s had also profound implications 
for the development of the industry and the process of its 
privatization.9 Hybrid crops provide high yields but also 
lose this advantage the following generation, thus leading 
farmers to buy new seeds regularly.
8.  Genetically modified (GM) (and shortly genetically 
edited following the development of the CRISPR/Cas 
technology) seeds are at the center of the innovative effort 
in modern agriculture, the plant science industry being 
one of the world’s most R&D intensive industries, with 
no more than 10 big corporations controlling almost 50% 
of all seeds planted on Earth right now (some estimates 
putting this figure to 73%, in 2010 up from 37% in 1995).10 
The plant biotechnology R&D industry now consists 
of six large firms, a varying number of smaller firms, 
and public-sector research organizations. The degree of 
consolidation of this industry is remarkable if  one takes 
into account that in the early 1980s there were more than 
two hundred different seed companies and that many 
agricultural chemical companies had both seeds and 
agricultural chemicals.11
7 M. Llewelyn, The Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: An Alter-
native Approach, (1997) 19 European Intellectual Property Review 115, 117. 
The UN Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force on 29 
December 1993, is still recognizing the importance of communal “knowledge, 
innovations and practices” and encourages its signatories to “promote their 
wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices,” and further encourages the “equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innova-
tions and practices” (Article 8(j)). 
8 See, S. D. Biggs and E. J. Clay, Sources of innovations in agricultural 
technology, (1981) 9 World Development 321-336 (distinguishing between 
formal and informal agricultural research and development, farmers having 
played and still playing a significant role in informal R&D).
9 D. Lim, Living with Monsanto, (2015) Michigan State Law Review 559, 566-
567
10 See ETC Group, Who will control the Green Economy? (November 2011), 
available at http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/ 
pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf.
11 See our analysis, section III.
In the seed business IPRs consist of patents, 
plant variety rights, trademarks and trade secrets
9.  A lot of these companies control IPRs. In the seed 
business IPRs consist of patents, plant variety rights, 
trademarks and trade secrets.12 These IP rights enable 
seed companies to prevent farmers from saving seeds 
of the protected variety, sharing it with their neighbors 
or selling it informally (“brown bagging”), but also to 
prevent competing plant breeders from using a protected 
variety in the development of a new variety (cumulative 
innovation), and to prevent competing seed producers 
from multiplying and marketing the protected variety 
without a license or using a protected product names and 
logos.13 Seed laws requiring compulsory seed certification 
with the aim to police seed quality also provide some 
form of protection to breeders, in the absence of IPRs.
10.  Until recently, patents on living organisms were not 
recognized. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the U.S. Supreme 
Court extended patent claims to life sciences, this leading 
to the emergence of the biotechnology industry.14 In 1985, the 
USPTO expanded patent protection to genetically modified 
traits in Ex Parte Hibberd.15 In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held for the first time in J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer that 
utility patents may be issued for crops and other flowering 
(sexually reproducing) plants.16 With a utility patent, patent-
holders can sue farmers and rivals for patent infringement 
and pursue litigation to enforce licensing agreements. Utility 
patents are routinely used for genetically modified traits, 
traditional germplasm and biotechnology research tools. 
The germplasm consists in the living tissue from which new 
plants can be grown and contains information on the species’ 
genetic make-up (the hereditary material in a plant coded in 
its DNA). The traits are engineered by insertion of foreign 
genes into the plants. These genes may be single or stacked 
and usually confer a desirable attribute to the seed, for 
instance herbicide or insect resistance. The emergence of IP 
protection, with an extensive reliance on utility patents, led 
to a shift of the paradigm from public sector innovation to 
private sector innovation, particularly in plant technologies 
and molecular level agricultural biotechnology.17
12 For a description, see UNIDROIT, Intellectual Property Rights and Contract 
Farming, Study 80-A – Doc. 1 Add. 18 (August 2014), available at http://
www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2014/study80a/wg04/s-80a-01-
add18-e.pdf. However, in view of the possibilities of replication through 
reverse engineering trade secrets are not the most optimal way to protect 
products sold on the open market.
13 N. P. Louwaars et al., Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights 
Regimes on the Plant Breeding Industry in Developing Countries, (World Bank 
Report, February 2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/ 
LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05.pdf, p. 27. 
14 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Board of Patent Applications and Interferences, 1985).
16 J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 
(2001). This overlapping protection was significant as U.S. Plant variety 
protection legislation [7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544] conferred “less robust protection 
than utility patents” as it allows farmers to save seeds for replanting and provides 
for a research exception for private, non-commercial uses of protected seed. See, 
D. Lim, Living with Monsanto, (2015) Michigan State Law Review 559, 567.
17 P. W. Heisey, J. L. King and K. D. Rubenstein, Patterns of Public-Sector 
and Private-Sector Patenting in Agricultural Biotechnology, (2005) 8 
AGBIOFORUM 73. Ce
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11.  The scope of patentability is more delineated in 
Europe, where plant varieties and essential biological 
processes are excluded from patent protection,18 also 
in view of the need to avoid a double protection under 
patent law and the sui generis plant variety protection 
resulting from the UPOV (Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants) Convention.19 However, the 
European Directive  98/44/EC on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions led to the possibility of 
patenting when the technical feasibility of the invention 
is not confined to a specific plant variety.20 In 1999, the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office 
(EBA) stated that “(a) patent cannot be granted for a 
single plant variety but can be granted if varieties may 
fall within the scope of its claims.”21 Indeed, according 
to Recital  31 of the Biotechnology Directive, “a plant 
grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and 
not its whole genome) is not covered by the protection 
of new varieties and is therefore not excluded from 
patentability even if it comprises new varieties of plants.” 
Plant varieties may also fall within the scope of patent 
claims when they are the direct product of a patented 
non-biological process. The most recent jurisprudence 
of the EBA has reduced even further the patentability 
exception enshrined in Article  53(b) EPC, even for a 
patent claim for a product that is directly obtained and/or 
defined by an “essentially biological process.” The EBA 
held that “the fact that the only method available at the 
filing date for generating the claimed subject-matter is an 
essentially biological process for the production of plants 
disclosed in the patent application does not render a patent 
claim directed to plants or plant material other than a 
plant variety unallowable.”22 In essence, the EBA found 
that the patentability exception in Article  53(b) EPC 
for “essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants” had to be interpreted narrowly and did not extend 
beyond the excluded processes in order to cover products 
18 Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention. According to this provision, 
“European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (…) (b) plant or animal 
varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
or animals; this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or 
the products thereof.” See also Article 4(1) of Directive 98/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13, which stipulates that 
“essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals” 
“shall not be patentable.” 
19 International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Ger.-
Neth.-U.K., Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 
1978 and Mar. 19, 1991).
20 Article 4(2) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, 
OJ 1998 L 213/13. According to Article 2 of Directive 98/44/EC, “(a) process 
for the production of plants or animals is essentially biological if it consists 
entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or selection.”
21 Transgenic Plant/NOVARTIS II, G 001/98 [2000] OJ 111.
22 Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 1242/06, Case G 0002/12, 
Tomato II (March 25, 2015); Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal 
number T 0083/05 – 3.3.04, Case G 0002/13, Broccoli II (March 25, 2015). 
It is noteworthy that the Enlarged Board of Appeal emphasized that “there 
is no general notion of an obligatorily restrictive construction of exceptions 
to patentability, for example, such as that adopted by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) when insisting on a narrow interpretation 
of exceptions to or derogations from fundamental EC Treaty principles 
embodied in the four freedoms” (case G002/13, p. 41). Hence, the exclusion 
of patentability incorporated in Article 53(b) EPC of “essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants” does not cover any product of such a 
process, but only excludes biological breeding processes sensu stricto.
defined or obtained by such processes. Hence, a product 
resulting from an “essentially biological process for the 
production of plants or animals” may be patented as long as 
(i) the patentability requirements (novelty, inventive step, 
industrial application) are satisfied, (ii) the claim defines 
the product to be covered, either in a product format or 
in a product-by-process format, and (iii) the patent does 
not claim a single plant variety, which is something that is 
explicitly excluded from the scope of patentability under 
Article 53(b) EPC. This is a very favorable position for 
large agrochemical corporations23 and contrasts with the 
more restrictive approach followed by some EU member 
States’ patent legislation, which exclude product claims 
from patentability where the claimed products have been 
generated by an essentially biological process for the 
protection of plants.24
12.  Opportunities for access to proprietary knowledge 
through IP law are generally limited. The EU 
biotechnology directive includes the possibility of 
compulsory cross-licensing for non-exclusive use where 
a breeder cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety 
right without infringing a prior patent, inasmuch as 
the license is necessary for the exploitation of the plant 
variety to be protected. This is subject to payment of an 
appropriate royalty on reasonable terms.25 Nevertheless, 
the conditions to apply for compulsory cross-licensing 
are quite restrictive, as applicants must show that “(a) 
they have applied unsuccessfully to the holder of the patent 
or of the plant variety right to obtain a contractual licence; 
(b) the plant variety or the invention constitutes significant 
technical progress of considerable economic interest 
compared with the invention claimed in the patent or the 
protected plant variety.”26
13.  According to the TRIPS agreement, every country 
must have at least sui generis protection for plants. 
Article 27.3(b) allows WTO members to exclude “plants 
and animals other than micro-organisms and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants and 
animals other than biological and microbiological 
processes,” provided that they offer patents or establish 
“an effective sui generis system” of protection for plant 
varieties. Yet, the WTO stays short in defining precisely 
what constitutes an “effective sui generis system.” 
23 See, the discussion in T. Minssen and A. Nordberg, The Impact of Broccoli II 
& Tomato II on European patents in conventional vreeding, GMO’s and 
Synthetic Biology: The grand finale of a juicy patents tale?, (2015) 34 (3) 
Biotechnology Law Report 81–98.
24 Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 0083/05 - 3.3.04, Case G 
0002/13, Broccoli II (March 25, 2015), pp. 64–65 [Part VIII(2)6d] referring 
to recent amendments to this effect in the German Patent Act of 1936 (as 
amended in 2013) and in the Dutch Patent Act 1995 (as amended in 2014). 
However, as the EBA noted, “no such amendments have been made in (…) 
the United Kingdom, (…) France (…) Austria (…) and Switzerland”. It 
remains to be seen if the Court of Justice of the EU will adopt such a narrow 
interpretation of the exclusion of patentability of products deriving from 
essentially biological processes, when interpreting the exclusion rule under 
Article 4(1) of the Biotechnology Directive, the CJEU not being bound by 
the EBA jurisprudence.
25 Article 12, Article 4(2) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13.
26 Ibid. Ce
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Many jurisdictions protect plant varieties 
through the Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants Convention
14.  Many jurisdictions protect plant varieties through 
the UPOV (Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants) Convention, which was adopted in 1961, 
in order to safeguard the interests of farmers and 
breeders with exemptions permitting farmers to save 
seed from one growing season to another and allowing 
breeders to use protected seeds for research purposes.27 
UPOV is an intergovernmental organization, most of 
its members being developed industrialized countries, 
which administers common rules for the recognition 
and protection of plant variety protection globally. 
Plant variety rights constituted the main form of sui 
generis IP protection until the U.S. Supreme Court 
opened the possibility in Diamond v. Chakrabarty for 
living organisms, such as germplasm and GM traits to 
constitute patentable subject matter. Like patents, plant 
variety protection provides patent-like rights to plant 
breeders. These sui generis IPRs protect the genetic 
makeup of a specific plant variety, the criteria for 
protection being novelty, distinctness, uniformity and 
stability. Plant variety protection confers a bundle of 
rights to the developer of a novel combination of genes 
manifested as a distinct, uniform, and stable variety (the 
phenotype of the variety) without any need to prove an 
inventive step nor a specific utility, as title is provided 
solely on the evaluation of the variety’s value in terms 
of genetic quality. Although plant variety protection 
laws can provide exemptions for breeders, allowing them 
to use protected varieties for further breeding, and for 
farmers, allowing them to save seeds from their harvest, 
these exceptions are provided under highly restricted 
conditions and these regimes have become more and 
more similar to the protection provided by patents, in 
particular since the 1991 UPOV Convention. 
15.  The boundaries of these IP rights have also 
been broadly interpreted. In Erauw-Jacquery v. 
La Hesbignonne, the Court of Justice of the EU held that 
a prohibition on the sale or export of basic seeds by the 
IP right holder was not subject to Article 101 TFEU since 
considerable investment had been made in developing the 
basic seed. According to the Court, “a person who has 
made considerable efforts to develop varieties of basic seed 
which may be the subject-matter of plant breeders’ rights 
must be allowed to protect himself against any improper 
handling of those varieties of seed” and “to that end, the 
breeder must be entitled to restrict propagation to the 
growers which he has selected as licensees.”28 
27 International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Ger.-
Neth.-U.K., Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 
1978 and Mar. 19, 1991).
28 Case 27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hesbignonne SC [1988] 
ECR 1919. See also, Case 258/78, Nungesser v. Commission [1982] 
ECR 2015, § 10.
The plant variety protection rights have also 
been implemented in developing countries 
and emergent economies
16.  The plant variety protection rights have also been 
implemented in developing countries and emergent 
economies, under direct or indirect pressure from 
developed countries, in the context of bilateral trade 
and investment agreements containing an obligation 
for developing countries to embrace UPOV rules. It has 
been noted that many developing countries’ governments 
were critical of IPRs protection in the area of biological 
resources, “partly because of their own (varied) national 
histories of community ownership of biological resources 
and partly because patenting has become a central 
mechanism for the capture (and exploitation by developed 
country-based corporations) of natural resources and 
their genetic materials.”29 Implementation of the UPOV 
rules and other forms of IPRs protection in the sphere 
of biological resources in the developing countries 
highlights an important tension between different 
approaches to incentivizing innovation in this area. 
Traditional approaches based on principles of sharing 
and open access to knowledge run into conflict with an 
exclusionary approach based on privatization of genetic 
information and controlled methods of production. 
17.  We can see, for instance in the case of India, that 
the scope of IPRs protection in the area of biological 
resources has been interpreted differently so as to provide 
increased opportunities of access to genetic information. 
India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights 
Act 2001 (PVPFR Act), which became fully operational 
in 2007, requires that the breeder or any other person 
entitled to produce, market and sell the seeds of a 
registered variety must make such seeds or propagating 
materials available to farmers “in a timely manner” in 
order to “satisfy their requirements” and “at a reasonable 
market price.”30 A number of provisions in the PVPFR Act 
directly or indirectly recognize specific rights of, or grant 
entitlements to, farmers and the farming community.31 
Farmers have the right to “save, use, sow, resow, exchange, 
share or sell” farm produce including seed of a protected 
variety in the same manner as they were entitled to prior 
to the PVPFR Act, without, however, that involving 
the right to sell branded seed of a protected variety. 
Farmers are also entitled to recognition and reward in 
cases where the genetic material they preserved and 
improved is used in developing new varieties. Farmers 
have the right to claim compensation from the breeder, 
if  the variety they purchased fails to perform as per the 
disclosure made by the breeder. Finally, they are immune 
from infringement legal action, if  such infringement was 
29 Ch. May and S. K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History 
(Lynne Rienner Pub, London, 2006), p. 191.
30 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Rules, 2003 (as amended 
in 2012), Rule 36A.
31 For a description, see S. Koonan, India’s sui generis system of plant variety 
protection, (January 2014), available at http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/ 
resources/QUNO%20India%20-%20plant%20variety%20protection%20
-%202014.pdf. Ce
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innocent. Most importantly, the Authority in charge of 
the implementation of the Act is empowered to issue a 
compulsory license after three years of registration, if  
the breeder fails to satisfy the reasonable requirements of 
the public for the seed or other propagating material or 
that the seed or propagating material has not been made 
available to the public at a reasonable price. The effect 
of UPOV protection on the quality or diversity of plant 
varieties is a matter for investigation, much commercial 
breeding being directed at cosmetic changes in order 
to serve market strategies.
IP right holders may also take measures 
in order to avoid problems with regard 
to the implementation of their IP rights 
18. IP right holders may also take measures in order to 
avoid problems with regard to the implementation of 
their IP rights, in particular in developing jurisdictions 
with weak IP enforcement systems. Material transfer 
agreements between the IP right holders and farmers 
may specify the conditions under which a seed sample 
will be exchanged. Those holding utility patent rights 
in seed may sell subject to a contractual provision that 
bars the farmer from saving seed and using it to grow 
another generation of crops, thus controlling farmers 
through purchase agreements. An example is Monsanto’s 
Roundup Ready® Technology Agreement that usually 
provides that the farmer cannot save seed or any other 
part of the crop grown from the Monsanto seed for 
replanting and that the farmer is prohibited from 
supplying seed to any other person. Violation of these 
licenses may be regarded as a breach of contract subject 
to draconic sanctions, the farmer being obliged to pay 
120 times the technology fee plus the legal fee if  he/she 
is caught violating the agreement. Enforcement of these 
contractual clauses involves the continuous inspection of 
the farmers’ fields by Monsanto’s staff. Binding arbitration 
constitutes a default dispute resolution mechanism. One 
may consider these contractual limitations of traditional 
farmer seed saving and sharing practices as introducing a 
restriction to research and seed development by farmers 
and thus a restriction on innovation. Monsanto may 
advance that such restrictions are necessary in order to 
protect its own incentives to innovate, due to its investment 
in R&D to develop the technology and the need to recoup 
the costs by the appropriation of the profits arising out 
of the productivity improvements introduced by its 
innovative effort.
19. The seed industry has also put in place biological tools 
to protect its IP rights by developing hybridization, or more 
recently through cytoplasmic male sterility, one of the most 
efficient ways to produce F1 (the first filial generation of 
offspring of distinctly different parental types) hybrid seeds. 
Another biological protection is Genetic Use Restriction 
Technology (GURT), with the development of terminator 
technologies preventing farmers from saving seeds since 
the genetically engineered plants will not germinate in 
subsequent generations or will not express the specific trait 
(e.g. herbicide resistance) that is protected by IP rights, 
unless the plant is sprayed with specific chemicals in order 
to activate the right gene. These biological protection 
instruments are particularly useful in jurisdictions with weak 
enforcement of IPRs.32 These technologies are protected by 
patents, a great number of them being held by few global 
seed companies. This IP-based business environment makes 
it quite difficult for public institutions to assert themselves in 
the process of innovation in the seed industry and promote 
the open access and sharing ethos that was prevalent 
prior to the expansion of IPRs in this sector of activity. 
These IP rights related strategies had an impact on the 
development of a concentrated structure for various factors 
of production markets and the important consolidation of 
the seed industry following a wave of M&A activity.
III. The development of 
a concentrated market
20.  We will focus on the M&A activity of global seed 
players, before exploring the level of concentration in this 
market. This concentration is not only limited to seeds. 
It is also reported that the 10 biggest pesticide firms 
now control 90% of the global pesticide market, that 10 
companies control 76% of the animal pharmaceutical 
sales and that 10 animal feed companies control 52% of 
the global animal market.33 The increasing consolidation 
of the inputs market may raise important public policy 
concerns, in particular as the share of the total surplus 
value appropriated by the farmers has considerably fallen. 
This may be of concern in particular for jurisdictions 
not disposing of sophisticated state subsidies regimes 
enabling some transfer of resources to poorer rural 
communities, highly dependent on agriculture. 
1. M&A activity of global seed players
21.  We analyzed mergers and acquisition activity of 
the global seed industry leaders (Monsanto, Syngenta, 
DuPont Pioneer). We used S&P Capital IQ database to 
conduct our analysis, a recognized M&A intelligence tool34 
which maintains a database of global M&A transactions 
and other financial information and provides analytics.35
32 Yet, they may raise issues as to the possible extension of the scope of the 
IP right, should the terminator technologies being considered disproportional 
remedies in order to protect the essence of the IP right.
33 ETC, Who will Control the Green Economy? (November 2011), available 
at http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/
ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf. 
34 S&P Capital IQ is a part of McGraw Hill Financial, Inc., a leading provider of 
data, research and analytics (http://www.spcapitaliq.com).
35 For our analysis we counted only mergers and acquisition deals not including 
capital raising deals (private placement, public offering), share buybacks, spin-
offs and split-offs. We concentrated mostly on completed deals (marked as 
“closed”) and tried to exclude internal deals (i.e., where transactions were held 
between headquarters and subsidiaries or within subsidiaries). For Monsanto 
and DuPont Pioneer Hi-Bred we covered a period from 1995 till February 20, 
2016, for Syngenta a period between 2000 and February 20, 2016. In addition 
to S&P Capital IQ we also used corporate press releases as well as other 
publicly available information. Since for some transactions of Monsanto and 
Syngenta financial values remain undisclosed, the figures in Tables 1–3 are 
based on publicly available information for deals with disclosed data. Ce
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22. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1 
(Monsanto), Table  2 (Syngenta) and Table 3 (DuPont 
Pioneer Hi-Bred). Although the number of targets is 
the same for Monsanto and Syngenta, our analysis 
shows that Monsanto was acquiring much bigger targets 
spending on M&A almost six times more (USD 11.9bn 
vs USD 2bn for Syngenta).
Table 1. Mergers and acquisitions of Monsanto (1995‑2015)
  1995‑2005 2006‑2010 2010‑2015 subtotal
Number of Deals 10 11 9 30
of which        
seeds, ag. 
products (crops, 
cereals, etc.)
9 9 1 19
fertilizers / 
pesticides / 
chemicals 
- - 1 1
biotech products - - 5 5
other (IT, peat, 
distribution, animal 
feed, etc.)
1 2 2 5
Total transaction 
volume*, usDm   6 974,77   3 486,85   1 519,0 11 980,62
Table 2. Mergers and acquisitions of syngenta (2000‑2015)
  2000–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 subtotal
Number of Deals 6 16 8 30
of which        
seeds, agriculture 
products (crops, 
cereals, etc.)
5 11 4 20
traditional fertilizers 
/ pesticides / 
chemicals 
- - - -
biotech (pesticides, 
other) - 1 2 3
others (IT, peat, 
distribution, animal 
feed, etc.)
1 4 2 7
Total transaction 
volume*, usDm 654,28 607,62 741,57 2 003,47
Table 3. Mergers and acquisitions of DuPont‑Pioneer 
(1995‑2015) 
  1995‑2005 2006‑2010 2011‑2015 subtotal
Number of Deals 1 10 1 12
of which        
seeds, agriculture 
products (crops, 
cereals, etc.)
1 7 1 9
traditional fertilizers 
/ pesticides / 
chemicals 
- - - -
biotech (pesticides, 
other) - 1 - 1
others (IT software) - 2 - 2
Total transaction 
volume*, usDm n/a n/a n/a  
23. Prior to emergence of Syngenta in 1999, from 1995 till 
2000 Monsanto kept itself busy by actively consolidating the 
market via acquisitions of leading players such as DeKalb 
Genetics (USD 2.2bn), Cargill Seeds Operations (USD 
1.4bn) and other recognized players in the area of corn, 
sunflower, soybean and cotton seeds. Over the period of 
2000–2010 Monsanto continued to acquire leading players 
of the seed market often with a market capitalization close 
to or exceeding a billion U.S. dollars, i.e. Seminis (USD 
1,7bn; 2005), Delta and Pine Land Company (USD 1,6bn, 
2006), De Ruiter Seeds Group (0,86bn; 2008). 
24. A notable exception from a series of seeds targets was 
the recent acquisition of the Climate Corporation (USD 
0,93bn, 2013). The company is known for producing 
software and hardware as well as insurance products for 
farmers for weather monitoring and agronomic modeling. 
The size of the transaction indicates a serious bet by 
Monsanto in the diversification of its business model into 
IT-type of services. A number of transactions over the 
period of 2010–2015 were marked as biotech (microbes, 
microRNA technology, small molecule pharmacology, 
synthetically derived vaccines and antimicrobials, 
ribonucleic acid interference products, etc.).
25.  In 2015 Monsanto announced a USD 45bn bid to 
acquire Syngenta. The bid was rejected by Syngenta 
shareholders. It was estimated that the merged company 
could alone control 45% of the commercial seed market 
and a 30% share of pesticides market (based on 2014 
financial reports).36 
26. Syngenta emerged as a spin-off after the merger between 
the agrochemical business of pharmaceutical corporation 
AstraZeneca and the seeds and crop protection business 
of Novartis. Between 2000 and 2015 Syngenta continued 
steady M&A activity; however the company pursued 
smaller size targets compared to Monsanto. Its biggest 
deal was the acquisition of a Belgian biotech company 
Devgen (closed in 2014) for USD 512,6m.
27.  Pioneer Hi-Bred International was acquired by 
El DuPont de Nemours & Co in 1999. Since then this 
division manages the agriculture business of Dupont. 
By the end of 2014 the annual net sales figure of the 
division reached almost USD 11.3bn. Unlike its rivals, 
mostly Monsanto and Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred was 
less acquisitive. We identified 11 deals where Pioneer was 
buyer of the seeds assets (Table  3). Most acquisitions 
were announced in 2008–2011 and completed in 
2010–2014. Two of the acquisitions are software deals 
(Farms Technology, LLC which provides Internet-
based procurement applications and Map Shots, Inc., 
which is active in precision agriculture software sales). 
The majority of DuPont Pioneer’s transactions (9 out of 
11 deals) are acquisitions of seeds producers: two of them 
based in India, one in South Africa, and the rest were US 
incorporated seed companies. In 2008 DuPont launched 
36 J. Bunge and A. Morse, Monsanto Makes Bid to Go Big in Pesticides, Wall 
Street Journal, (8 May 2015), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
syngenta-rejects-unsolicited-monsanto-acquisition-proposal-1431069142. * Based on publicly disclosed information Ce
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the PROaccess platform which enables the company 
to sell its seeds to more growers through a network of 
distributors via special distribution agreements. Over 
the period 2008–2011, Pioneer acquired many of its 
partners of PROaccess platform including AgVenture, 
Hoegemeyer Hybrids, NuTech Seed, Seed Consultants, 
Terral Seed (all deal announced in 2010), and Doebler’s 
Pennsylvania Hybrids (2011). No transaction data 
was disclosed on any of DuPont’s deals. Interestingly, 
Pioneer Hi-Bred was more involved in divestments than 
in acquisitions over the period under review. In 2014, the 
company sold pesticides business assets to its rivals such 
as Bayer, Sumimoto Chemicals, Mitsui, S&W Seed, and 
Syngenta. Over the last 5 years, Pioneer continued to sell 
pesticides and chemical assets while acquiring mostly 
seeds companies. This less active M&A strategy compared 
to Monsanto and Syngenta may be contrasted to the 
activity of DuPont Pioneer in filing patent applications. 
According to a recent study of Jefferson et al. (2015), 
DuPont (together with its affiliates) is a global leader in 
plant-related IP rights portfolio (i.e., in utility patents for 
maize, rice and soybean plants), far exceeding the rest of 
the US industry, which includes small biotech companies, 
governmental research institutes, and universities, 
followed by Monsanto and other industry players.37
Over the past six months two historic 
events for the agrichemical markets 
were announced
28.  Over the past six months two historic events for 
the agrichemical markets were announced. The first 
one relates to the merger between the Dow Chemical 
Company and DuPont, which was announced on 
December 11, 2015. According to the press-release, 
“the combined company will be named DowDuPont and 
have a combined market capitalization of approximately 
$130 billion at announcement…The transaction is expected 
to deliver approximately $3  billion in cost synergies.”38 
Following the merger, the company will be separated 
into three independent, publicly traded companies, in 
agrichemicals, materials science, and speciality products. 
The new agrichemicals company will possess combined 
DuPont’s and Dow’s seeds and crop protection businesses 
with total revenues approximating USD 19 billion, and 
would sell about 41% of U.S. corn seeds and related 
genetics.39 Following the announcement of the DuPont 
Dow merger, another mega-deal was announced 
between Syngenta and ChemChina (on February 3, 2016 
ChemChina made an offer to acquire Syngenta’s shares). 
Headquartered in Beijing, ChemChina is the largest 
chemical corporation in China with net sales in excess of 
USD 39bn. Syngenta’s sales figures exceeded USD 13.4bn 
37 O. A. Jefferson, D. Köllhofer, T. H. Ehrich and R. A. Jefferson. The 
ownership question of plant gene and genome intellectual properties, Nature 
Biotechnology, Vol. 33, No. 11, November 2015
38 Companies press-release, http://www.dow.com/news/press-releases/dupont%20
and%20dow%20to%20combine%20in%20merger%20of%20equals
39 Jacob Bunge et al., Dow Chemical Agree to Merge, the Break Up into Three 
Companies, Wall Street Journal, (11 December 2015), available at http://
www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-dow-chemical-agree-to-merge-1449834739. 
in 2015. A combined company will have an estimated 
revenue of about USD 17bn (counting only seed and 
pesticides division), making it the second largest global 
player on the agricultural market. The DowDuPont 
Agriculture business spin-off  would become the global 
leader.40 The deal highlights China’s ambition about food 
security and its dedication and persistence to get access 
to modern technologies. The merger has been viewed as a 
win-win transaction for Syngenta as well, given the great 
opportunities for the Swiss-based company arising from 
a growing demand in the food market in China. Should 
these transactions close successfully, Monsanto, whose 
bid for Syngenta’s acquisition was rejected by Syngenta’s 
shareholders in 2015, will move from the leading position 
it currently holds to the third position in terms of revenue 
size. This will bring down the number of major global 
companies producing crop seeds and pesticides from 6 
to 4 and transform an already concentrated industry to a 
tight oligopoly on a global scale.
2. Industry concentration
29.  The analysis of the seed M&A activity the last 
15 years provides a good sense of the magnitude of the 
consolidation trend in the seed industry. 
30.  High concentration in the food industry is not 
unusual. This phenomenon has been extensively studied 
over the last several years. Hoppe and Banker argue that 
80 to 90% of U.S. food production is produced by 10 
to 20% of farmers.41 The U.S. food processing sector is 
also highly concentrated42: according to the Economic 
Research Service (ERS), 12% of plants with more than 
100 employees ship 77% of all value of food in the U.S. 
food manufacturing industry.43 Macdonald and McBride 
indicate that the top four beef processing companies’ 
share of the U.S. slaughter market increased from 36 to 
79% over the period 1980–2005.44 Vertical integration 
is a key trend in many food chain subsectors when key 
players transform themselves through a series of strategic 
moves to diversify their business. A notable example is 
the U.S. poultry industry which experienced vertical 
integration trends where few integrators (companies 
that own feeding, hatching and processing poultry) have 
market power over poultry growers.45
40 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-03/chemchina-offers-to-
purchase-syngenta-for-record-43-billion
41 R. A. Hoppe and D. E. Banker, Structure and Finances of U.S. Farms: Family 
Farm Report, EIB-66. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, (2010).
42 M. C. Nesheim, M. Oria and P. Tsai Yih (eds.), A Framework for Assessing 
Effects of the Food System. National Academy of Sciences (2015), available 
at http://nycfoodpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A-Framework-for-
Assessing-Effects-of-the-Food-System.pdf.
43 Economic Research Service Manufacturing (2014), available at http://
www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-prices/processingmarketing/
manufacturing.aspx#.Uvowa_vwv3t (accessed November 24, 2014). 
44 James M. MacDonald and William D. McBride, The transformation of U.S. 
livestock agriculture: Scale, efficiency and risks, (2009) U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Economic Information Bulletin 43.
45 M. C. Nesheim, M. Oria and P. Tsai Yih (eds.), A Framework for Assessing 
Effects of the Food System. National Academy of Sciences (2015), p. 53. Ce
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The level of concentration of the seed 
industry is remarkable
31.  However the level of concentration of the seed 
industry is remarkable even considering traditionally 
high food sector concentration. Howard argues that 
the rapid consolidation of the seed industry led to 
global dominance by a few companies, with Monsanto, 
Syngenta and DuPont being the most powerful of them.46 
As a result, the four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in 
the crop seeds sector has reached 54% according to a 
recent U.S. National Academy of Sciences Report.47 
Fuglie et al. have demonstrated that few leaders in such 
industries as agricultural chemicals, farm machinery 
and animal breeding have more than 50% of the global 
market sales.48 The latest estimates suggest that “the 
Big Six” (Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, BASF, Bayer, 
Dow) collectively control more than 75% of the global 
agrochemical market, 63% of the commercial seed 
market and almost three quarters of R&D in the seeds 
and pesticides sector (the combined R&D budget of the 
Big Six increased USDA crop science research budget 
more than 15 times in 2013).49 The same is true for the 
farm equipment sector where top three companies (Deere 
& Co, CNH, AGCO) control 49% market share (201350).
The EU authorities are also increasingly 
concerned about the high concentration 
of the EU seed market
32.  The EU authorities are also increasingly concerned 
about the high concentration of the EU seed market. 
As  argued by Mammana, contrary to the opinion that 
there are almost 7,000 seed companies operating on the 
EU seed market,51 there is considerable variation from 
country to country and market niche.52 For instance, a 
single company controls 45% of the wheat market in the 
UK; while 5 companies control 95% of the EU vegetable 
seed market. The maize seed sector is a vital part of the 
EU seed market accounting for 26%. It is controlled by 
46 P. H. Howard, Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–
2008, (2009) Sustainability 1(4):1266–1287; P. H. Howard, Seed Industry 
Structure, (2014), available at https://msu.edu/~howardp/seedindustry.html.
47 M. C. Nesheim, M. Oria and P. Tsai Yih (eds.), A Framework for Assessing 
Effects of the Food System. National Academy of Sciences (2015), p. 54. 
48 K. Fuglie et al., Rising Concentration in Agricultural Input Industries 
Influences New Farm Technologies, (2012) 10(4) Amber Waves 1-6, 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2012-december/rising-
concentration-in-agricultural-input-industries-influences-new-technologies.
aspx#.VpYe1-9unct. 
49 ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), 
Communiqué 115, available at http://www.etcgroup.org/content/breaking-
bad-big-ag-mega-mergers-play, p. 4. 
50 Ibid., p. 8. 
51 Official controls: Impact on food business operators - seeds and plants, 
the European Seed Association’s presentation to the European Parliament, 
14 October 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/
documents/envi/dv/envi20131014_doc14_biloni_/envi20131014_doc14_
biloni_en.pdf. 
52 I. Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in the EU Seed Market, 
(January 2014), Study commissioned by the Greens/EFA Group in the 
European Parliament. 
5 companies whose collective market share amounts to 
51.4%: the maize varieties of DuPont Pioneer accounting 
for a 12.2% market share, Syngenta for 11.5%, Limagrain 
for 9.7%, Monsanto for 8.95% and KWS for 8.9%, from 
a total of 4,975 maize varieties registered in the European 
Common Catalogue.53 According to a report of the 
European Parliament, EU farmers faced increases in 
prices of seeds and planting stock by 30% between 2000 
and 2010.54
IV. Competition 
dynamics in the seed 
industry
33. The significant transformation of the industry has led 
to the development of a different competitive interaction 
between the various players. We will examine the shift in the 
M&A activity of global seeds players, before commenting 
on their growth acceleration strategies that are essential in 
order to understand the new competitive game.
1. Global seeds players: 
A shift in strategy
34.  The results of the conducted analysis of M&A 
activity show (notably with regard to Monsanto) a shift 
in strategy from seeds acquisitions to acquisitions in the 
biotech and IT sectors. In biotech, the companies are 
rapidly developing microbial products which can either 
become complementary to the existing products or serve 
as a replacement of traditional chemistry (i.e., pesticides 
products).55 The global pesticides industry accounts for USD 
54,2bn (2013) and continues to grow steadily up to USD 
75.9bn by 2019.56 Microbial products are a new opportunity 
and potentially—a game changer and a disruptive 
technology—at the global scale. Although currently the 
industry is still in its infancy (less than USD 2bn of global 
sales in 2014), going forward it represents a huge potential, 
especially given the growing demand for organic farming 
globally. Realizing this, in 2014 Monsanto announced an 
alliance known as BIOAG Alliance with Novozymes, one 
of leaders in biotech industry. Novozymes is responsible 
for the production of the microbial products while 
Monsanto serves as the lead for field-testing, registration 
and commercialization for the Alliance’s products.57
53 Ibid. 
54 Report of the European Parliament on the farm input supply chain: structure 
and implications 2011/2114(INI), rapporteur José Bové, available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-
2011-0421&language=EN
55 R. Fraley, Citi 2014 Basic Materials Conference, (3 December 2014), available at 
http://www.monsanto.com/investors/documents/2015/2014.12.03_citi_fraley.pdf. 
56 C. Xie, Global Agrochemical Market will Continue to Maintain Steady 
Growth, (28 October 2014), available at http://news.agropages.com/News/
NewsDetail---13349.htm. 
57 BIOAG Alliance Fact Sheet, available at http://www.novozymes.com/en/
about-us/brochures/Documents/BioAg-Alliance-factsheet.pdf. Ce
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35.  A clear diversification move for global leaders is 
happening in the so-called “digital agriculture” market. 
Precision agriculture (or “precision farming”) is a global 
trend that is rapidly growing. By precision farming experts 
understand a data analysis at the level of the square meter 
or even smaller to optimize the consumption of inputs 
(seeds, water, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) and to monitor 
the actual process of production.58 Precision agriculture, 
for instance, may use sensors to collect information from 
soil (various parameters such as the level of moisture, 
fertilizers and pesticides, soil organic matter, various soil 
properties such as bulk density, texture, compaction, etc.) 
and satellite images about crop growth progress. It then 
would combine all information and use big data algorithms 
to analyze it, applying sophisticated mathematical 
models to plan and adjust in real-time for needed inputs 
to maximize the eventual crop yield. Precision agriculture 
is expected to revolutionize farming on a global scale 
within the next 10–15 years. The leading companies are 
rapidly enhancing this capability. The recent acquisition 
of the Climate Corporation by Monsanto is a bet to 
diversify beyond the traditional seeds and pesticides 
business model. The software developed by the Climate 
Corporation is aimed to become a powerful decision-
support system and a crop progress monitoring tool for 
a typical farmer.59 Combined with the existing product 
portfolio of Monsanto (seeds, traditional and bio-
pesticides, etc.) the data analysis and recommendation 
tool of the Climate Corporation will enable Monsanto 
to become an ultimate one stop-shop opportunity for 
a farmer. Monsanto intends to sell subscription to the 
software as a stand-alone service on a global scale. 
The  other “Big Six” of the seeds industry—Syngenta, 
DuPont Pioneer, Bayer, BASF and Dow—are rapidly 
catching up by developing their own IT-platforms.60 
2. The growth accelerators 
of global seeds producers
36. The growth engine of a corporation (how companies 
grow, what causes rapid growth) has long been one 
of the most fascinating topics for scholars studying 
corporate strategy and general management, although 
its lessons are still relatively unclear. One of the possible 
explanations of corporate growth engine worth studying 
was proposed by Achi et al. and is known as “growth 
cycles/accelerators.”61 Achi et al. studied 9,450 publicly 
listed companies to find 41 companies that have grown 
dramatically over the previous 10 years (growth rates 
in excess of 20%). They suggested that increasing 
returns driven by positive feedback loops are at the 
58 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030: The Reinvention of the 
Sector, (2015), available at https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/
articles/process-industries-innovation-crop-farming-2030-reinvention-sector.
59 D. Friedberg, The Climate Corporation Platform Update (21 August 2014), 
available at http://www.monsanto.com/investors/documents/whistle%20
stop%20tour%20vii%20aug%202014/the_climate_corporation_update.pdf. 
60 ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), 
Communiqué 115. 
61 Z. Achi et al., The Paradox of Fast Growth Tigers, McKinsey Quarterly, 
(1995) 3.
core of successfully growing companies. A number of 
generic self-reinforcing feedback loops common to 
the companies that experienced superior growth rates 
over a long time period was identified. The authors 
suggested that corporate management needs to combine 
several growth accelerators to win market share, lock-in 
customers, gain market power, and eventually ensuring its 
sustainable performance over a long timescale. The topic 
of corporate growth mechanisms through feedback 
loops and its implications for strategic management was 
discussed in the works of Morecroft (1985),62 Lyneis 
(1999),63 Sterman (2000),64 Warren (2004;65 200866), 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (200767), among others. 
37. In our opinion, this is a useful methodology for the 
analysis of the emergence of the global seed leaders 
over the last three decades. We think that considering 
the active mergers and acquisitions policy conducted 
by the “Big Six” as the only explanation of their rapid 
development is insufficient. Top factors that shaped 
the seed industry include: (1) consolidation, (2) R&D 
spending, (3) early adoption of the use of new promising 
genetics technology (i.e., RNA inhibition allowing 
selective control and the expression of individual genes), 
(4) vertical integration, (5) network externalities (sale 
of complementary products in addition to seeds—i.e., 
Monsanto’s corn seeds and “Roundup Ready”), (6) 
economies of scale from market expansion, and (7) 
product differentiation (seeds, pesticides, IT cloud-based 
decision support systems). Such factors are the core 
growth accelerators based on reinforcing feedback loops. 
Other accelerators fuelling the corporate engine of global 
seed and agriculture chemistry producers include IP 
rights protection, patent alliances to swap traits, market 
power resulting from increasing lobbying opportunities, 
etc. 
38.  A mechanism of gaining a competitive advantage 
through key growth accelerators is examined in more 
detail below (Figures 1–3) using a methodology of casual 
loops diagrams of system dynamics.68 
62 J. Morecroft, The feedback view of business policy and strategy, (1985) 1(1) 
System Dynamics Review 4–19. 
63 J. M. Lyneis, System dynamics for business strategy: a phased approach, 
(1999) 15 System Dynamics Review 37–70.
64 J. Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modelling for 
Complex World (McGraw Hill, 2000).
65 K. Warren, Why has feedback systems thinking struggled to influence 
strategy and policy formulation? Suggestive evidence, explanations and 
solutions (2004) 21 Systems Research and Behavioral Science 1–17. 
66 K. Warren, Strategic Management Dynamics (Wiley, 2008).
67 R. Casadesus-Masanell and J. E. Ricart, Competing Through Business 
Models, (November, 2007) IESE Business School Working Paper No. 713, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115201. 
68 E. F. Wolstenholme, Qualitative vs quantitative modelling: the evolving 
balance, (1999) 50 Journal of Operational Research Society, 422–428. Ce
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Figure 1 
39.  The most common growth accelerators for leading 
seed companies come from state-of-the-art research and 
development efforts resulting in advanced technologies 
(i.e., RNA inhibition, etc.) and products with a superior 
quality over competitors (i.e., seeds with higher yields 
or advanced resistance to insects) as well as substantial 
spending on marketing & distribution channels 
(Figure 1). A diversified pipeline of high quality products 
increases the attractiveness of a company’s products to 
customers thus increasing customer base, driving sales 
and revenues. Higher revenues allow strong R&D and 
marketing budgets, thus forming a powerful feedback 
loop based on the economic concept of increasing 
returns. 
Figure 2.
40. As a company grows in size, it gets access to favorable 
capital raising options, thus enhancing opportunities for 
M&A (Figure  2). Through acquisitions of promising 
start-ups or rivals with high potential products or 
advanced technologies the company adds to the existing 
product pipeline, driving further sales and revenues. This 
is another self-reinforcing growth cycle that was 
successfully employed by global seed and agrochemical 
companies over the last 20 years.
41. The market power of the “Big Six” is further enhanced 
by the cross-licensing agreements for genetically modified 
seed traits between Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, DuPont, 
BASF and Dow.69 This enables them to create additional 
69 P. H. Howard, Intellectual Property and Consolidation in the Seed Industry, 
(2015) 55(6) Crop Science 1–7, available at http://www.apbrebes.org/files/seeds/ 
files/Howard_seed_industry_patents_concentration_2015.pdf.
barriers to entry for new market players by enhancing 
intellectual property and trait licensing agreements 
(i.e, swap of traits, generic trait agreement to manage 
regulatory regime after expiration of patents) between 
them as well as settling litigation on the boundaries 
and the expiration of patents (i.e., peaceful resolution 
of patent litigation between Monsanto and DuPont in 
2013). The results obtained by Vergote and Grandjean70 
suggest that in some cases such cooperation between 
rivals may lead to increased barriers to entry for those 
who are not part of the network. An example of such 
a case has been documented by Bekkers et al.71 through 
the analysis of Motorola’s successful attempt to create a 
group of dominant players in the GSM industry in the 
1980s through cross-licensing agreements.
Figure 3
42.  An established customer base serves as an 
attractiveness anchor for third-parties (i.e., competitors, 
leading NGOs, etc.) to cooperate (Figure  3). The 
companies become engaged in alliances and networks for 
joint R&D opportunities (research for new technologies, 
products—a good example is Monsanto-Novozymes 
alliance), IP-protection issues (cross-licensing agreements, 
joint patents, arrangements on the competitive framework 
after patent expiration, etc.) or major industry initiatives 
(i.e., construction of the Svalbard Global Seed Vault). 
43. As the area under GMO plants continues to expand72 
the area under biotech crops increased every year from 
1996 to 2014 and accounted for more than 180 million 
hectares in 2014, leading seed production companies 
increasingly to gain market power. Eventually, a 
combination of several powerful positive feedback loops 
helps industry leaders to de facto lock-in sustainable 
competitive advantage and market dominance. Lobbying 
opportunities, as well as sponsoring of NGOs, various 
interest groups and the scientific community, helps to 
shape a positive corporate image and to sustain market 
power, thus further maintaining the status quo. Combined 
70 W. Vergote and G. J. Grandjean, Network formation among rivals, (2015) 
CEREC Working Papers 2014/9.
71 R. Bekkers, G. Duysters, and B. Verspagen, Intellectual Property Rights, 
Strategic Technology Agreements and Market Structure: The Case of GSM, 
(2002) 31(7) Research Policy 1141–1161.
72 C. James, Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, (Ithaca, NY, 
2014) ISAAA Brief No. 49. Ce
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altogether, the self-reinforcing feedback loops that drive 
growth accelerators for global seed industry leaders help 
them to create a superior competitive advantage over 
other industry rivals.
V. Implications for 
competition law 
and policy
44.  From this perspective, focusing on the level of 
concentration on a particular segment of the market, or 
ignoring the various sources of market power that the 
above competitive strategies highlight, leads to a myopic 
competition law and policy. The usual competition 
law tools have not been systematically used in order to 
deal with the resulting bottlenecks, as the competitive 
dynamics of the development of the industry and the 
consolidation of some key global seeds companies have 
not been clearly understood, and the role of IP rights in 
these competitive dynamics understated. Traditionally, 
competition law has dealt with such unbalances of 
power by reinforcing the bargaining power of farmers 
so as counterbalance that of other segments of the food 
value chain, downstream but also upstream, by enabling 
them to form agricultural cooperatives. These specific 
exceptions/regimes have nevertheless been under attack 
lately, as a result of the rise of a specific view of the 
consumer welfare paradigm in competition law.
1. Challenges for competition 
law enforcement in the seeds 
industry
45.  Competition law enforcement may engage with the 
IP practices of seed companies, mergers in this area and 
different forms of agreements linking the seed producers 
with farmers. 
By signing restrictive licensing agreements 
seed companies reduce farmers’ options and 
are thus able to raise licensing fees and seed 
prices for all farmers
46.  As explained above, IP rights play an increasing 
role in the competitive dynamics of the seed industry. 
The owners and developers of patented seed traits 
may exert considerable market power through cross-
licensing agreements with firms that want to include the 
patented technology, in most cases Monsanto traits, in 
their seed products. These cross-licensing agreements 
between Monsanto and its competitors in the seeds 
market enable the latter to exercise control over the way 
its competitors use the traits. Furthermore, Monsanto’s 
licensing agreements with farmers typically prohibit the 
traditional practice of saving seeds from harvested crops 
to plant the next season, thus limiting competition from 
seeds developed by farmers, and eventually leveraging 
their IP right in order to create or enhance market power 
in markets other than that covered by the IP right. 
Farmers dispose of three sources of buying seed: (i) 
obtain new seeds from seed companies, public institutes 
and dealers, (ii) save part of their own harvest for seeds 
and (iii) trade part of their harvest for seed from grain 
dealers.73 By signing restrictive licensing agreements seed 
companies reduce farmers’ options and are thus able to 
raise licensing fees and seed prices for all farmers. Other 
possible anticompetitive practices include exclusionary 
practices, such as exclusive dealing arrangements 
requiring licensees not to deal with competing technology 
providers, anti-stacking restrictions, and loyalty rebates 
to seed distributors limiting the sales of competing seeds. 
47.  Seed companies also actively implement their IP 
rights and combat “seed piracy,” filling a considerable 
number of patent infringement cases, even if  the farmer’s 
field was only inadvertently contaminated by neighboring 
genetically modified crops. It is always possible to oppose 
a competition law counterclaim to the patent infringement 
claims brought by the seed company, invoking illegal 
bundling or tying, de facto exclusive dealing, the refusal 
to access to essential facilities doctrine, input foreclosure, 
restrictions to innovation, in particular for restrictions 
included in cross-licensing agreements on the way rival 
seed companies may stack the protected traits with 
their own traits.74 It was, however, noted that these 
counterclaims have been generally unsuccessful.75 
48. In Bowman v. Monsanto, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
also reduced the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine 
in this industry by holding that the sale of one generation 
of seed does not exhaust rights on later generations. 
A  farmer who purchased seed to grow cannot sow a 
new crop using the seeds produced by the first crop—
as that, the Court held, would constitute making the 
patented product and not reusing or selling the seed that 
had been purchased.76 Bowman was found to infringe 
two of Monsanto’s patents because he “made” replicas 
of Monsanto’s genetically modified, herbicide-resistant 
soybean seeds, by simply planting, cultivating, harvesting, 
saving and then replanting the patented seeds. IP rights 
on self-replicated seeds are thus not exhausted by the first 
authorized sale to a farmer. Monsanto’s Roundup and 
Roundup Ready technology has since entered the public 
domain, as the patent expired in 2015, thus enabling 
competitors to introduce a generic version of the trait. 
However, Monsanto has patented the Genuity® Roundup 
Ready 2 Yield trait technology, these seeds being protected 
by a different utility patent which will not expire until 
the end of the next decade. The speed of the entry of 
73 J. P. Srivastava and S. Jaffee, Best Practices for Moving Seed Technology: 
New Approaches to Doing Business, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 
1993) World Bank Technical Paper No. 213.
74 D. L. Moss, Competition, Intellectual Property Rights, and Transgenic Seed, 
(2013) 58 South Dakota Law Review 543–559, p. 546.
75 Ibid.
76 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). Ce
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generics in this market will depend on the access generic 
seed companies may have to Monsanto’s data packages 
allowing them an advanced development and testing. 
This may raise equivalent competition issues than those 
routinely involved in the competition law enforcement in 
the pharmaceutical sector that led to jurisprudence such 
as FTC v. Actavis in the U.S.77 and Astra Zeneca in the 
EU with regard to strategies by incumbent IP holders to 
block the entry of generics, following the expiration of 
their IP rights.78
Taking into account the intense M&A 
activity in this market during the last twenty 
years, the lack of intervention appears 
intriguing
49. Competition authorities have been marginally more 
active in the seeds industry in the context of merger 
control. The U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division extracted 
remedies concerning the possible anticompetitive effects 
of licensing, in a series of mergers involving Monsanto 
acquiring the corn seed company DeKalb or the cotton 
seed companies Delta and Pine Land, where they 
imposed the condition that Monsanto removes anti-
stacking restrictions to its licensees, provides wide access 
through licensing to its germplasm, and divests some 
of its assets in germplasm and seeds.79 The European 
Commission has been relatively less active, with only 
one seeds merger case, since 2006, Syngenta’s acquisition 
of Monsanto’s sunflower seed business, being subject to 
remedial conditions. The Commission raised concerns 
over the possible effects of the merger, which would 
have removed a considerable competitor in the market 
for the commercialization of sunflower seeds in Spain 
and Hungary. It also expressed concerns with regard 
to the exchange and licensing of sunflower varieties, 
insofar as the merging parties would be in a position to 
restrict the access of competitors to inputs necessary for 
the commercialization of sunflower seeds. These would 
have led to the reduction of innovation, the foreclosure 
of competitors in the markets for the commercialization 
of sunflower seeds, and the reduction of the choice of 
sunflower seed hybrids for customers. To address these 
concerns, Monsanto agreed to divest its sunflower hybrids 
as well as the parental lines used in the creation of those 
hybrids, or those currently under development for the 
creation of hybrids for Spain and Hungary.80 Taking into 
account the intense M&A activity in this market during 
the last twenty years, this lack of intervention appears 
intriguing.81 This may be due to the fact that the existing 
turnover thresholds in Article  1 of the EU Merger 
77 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013).
78 Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v. European 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:770.
79 D. L. Moss, Competition, Intellectual Property Rights, and Transgenic Seed, 
(2013) 58 South Dakota Law Review 543–559, p. 546. 
80 Case No. COMP/M.5675 — Syngenta/Monsanto’s Sunflower Seed Business, 
C(2010) 7929 final.
81 See our analysis above Section III.1. 
Regulation may not catch merger activity in this highly 
evolving sector, as acquisitions of companies that did 
not achieve high turnover in the past are excluded from 
consideration,82 even if  the potential anti-competitive 
effect of such merger may be significant83 and in our view 
has to be subjected to competition law scrutiny ex ante. 
The economic potential of these merger transactions in 
terms of the possibilities of exercising market power in 
the future is probably better reflected by the purchase 
price (the transaction value) of these mergers, which is 
rather high as indicated above in view of the turnover 
made by the acquired targets. Article  22 of the EU 
Merger Regulation establishes a referral system ensuring 
that Member States may refer to the Commission those 
transactions that fall short of satisfying the jurisdictional 
criteria.84 It is noteworthy that the 2006 Syngenta’s 
acquisition of Monsanto’s sunflower seed business, which 
is the only EU seed merger case we identified post 2004, 
was referred to the Commission following a request from 
Spain and Hungary, pursuant to Article  22 of the EU 
Merger Regulation.
Out of the 180 cases investigated 
by National Competition Authorities 
in Europe in the food supply chain between 
2004 and 2011 only a handful concerned 
the seed industry
50.  It is also surprising that out of the 180 cases 
investigated by National Competition Authorities in 
Europe in the food supply chain between 2004 and 
2011, the overwhelming majority of those concerned 
the processing, retail and manufacturing level, only a 
82 According to Article 1 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 Merger 
Regulation, [2004] OJ L 24/1, a concentration is subject to the Commission’s 
merger jurisdiction if: “a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of 
all the undertakings concerned is more than 5000 million €; and (b) the 
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than 250 million €, unless each of the undertakings 
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide 
turnover within one and the same Member State,” or if “(a) the combined 
aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 
2500 million €; (b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined 
aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 100 million 
€; (c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of 
point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than 25 million €; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide 
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than 
100 million €, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than 
two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same 
Member State.”
83 The merger threshold operates as a proxy for an analysis of the effects of the 
merger. See Green Paper on the review of the Merger Regulation COM(96) 
19 final, OJ [1996] C 58, § 31.
84 Article 4(5) of the EU Merger Regulation also provides for another 
possibility of referral. According to this provision, a concentration which 
does not have a Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1 of 
the EU Merger Regulation and which is capable of being reviewed under the 
national competition laws of at least three Member States may be referred 
to the Commission if none of the Member States involved has expressed 
its disagreement. The merger will thus be deemed to have a Community 
dimension and shall be notified to the Commission. Ce
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handful concerned the seed industry.85 The factors of 
production segment of the food supply chain is barely 
examined in publications by Commission officials in 
charge of competition law enforcement initiatives in the 
food supply chain.86
51.  Monsanto’s licensing contracts have been found in 
some jurisdictions to provide the company the possibility 
to influence strategic decisions of licensee companies, 
thus transcending the object of the agreement. By 
significantly affecting the independence between the 
parties, these contracts were considered as a structural 
change that could be analyzed under merger control 
rules.87 For Instance, the Brazilian Administrative 
Council for Economic Defense (CADE) approved 
with restrictions four operations involving licensing 
agreements through which Monsanto do Brasil Ltda 
authorized other companies to develop, produce and 
sell, in Brazil, soybean seeds with Intact RR2 PROTM 
technology, owned by Monsanto. CADE conditioned the 
approval of the transactions to the change of clauses that 
gave Monsanto the possibility to influence the strategic 
decisions of the licensee companies. This influence did 
not only reach seed production with Intact technology 
but also extended to the total production of the licensee 
companies. The contractual provisions established a 
compensation mechanism for the licensee companies, 
based on sales of the Intact product and on the sales of 
certified seeds of Monsanto’s competitors. Had a licensee 
company chosen to expand its production by also using a 
patent from a competing product, the compensation from 
what had been produced with Intact technology would 
have been reduced accordingly. Monsanto’s competitor 
should have then counterbalanced the offer by paying for 
the correspondent profit reduction. 
52. The rise of this “contract agriculture,”88 the farmers 
entering into “take it or leave it” long-term exchanges 
with only a few companies controlling germplasm lead 
to a smaller share of the revenue from production going 
85 ECN Activities in the Food Sector – Report on competition law enforcement 
and market monitoring activities by European competition authorities in the 
food sector, ECN Subgroup (May 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf (noting a case in Portugal concerning 
tomato seeds, where the food processor Sugalidal had used contractual 
clauses which made the purchase of tomatoes conditional upon the seller 
buying tomato seeds from Sugalidal’s subsidiary; a case in Bulgaria regarding 
a cartel for price agreements in the sectors of production and distribution of 
sunflower seeds, processing of seeds, and production and trade of sunflower 
oil; a case in Spain, closed with a commitments decision, on the obligation 
imposed on farmers to acquire sunflower seeds from the companies to whom 
they sold the final sunflower production and a sector enquiry in Bulgaria 
on the competitive environment of the markets for production and trade of 
sunflower seeds and oil).
86 Ph. Chauve, A. Parera and A. Renckens, Agriculture, Food and Competition 
Law: Moving the Borders, (2014) 5(5) Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice 304–313.
87 On this case, see V. Marques de Carvalho, Agreements and Competition 
Enforcement: The Choice between Preventive and Repressive Channels, in 
B. Hawk (ed.), Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
(Juris, 2014) 37–47, pp. 41–42.
88 N. E. Hart, The Age of Contract Agriculture: Consequences of concentration 
in Input Supply, (2000) 18(1) Journal of Agribusiness 115–127; J. MacDonald 
et al., Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of 
Agricultural Commodities, (2004) Agricultural Economic Report No. 837 9, 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/284610/aer837_1_.pdf.
to the farmer, the lion’s share of the revenue ending up 
with the global seed companies holding the rights to 
the technology involved. One may also note that the 
effect of these strategies is reinforced by the increasing 
financialization of agricultural commodities trade, 
financial speculation on agricultural commodities being 
facilitated by the creation of new financial devices with 
the aim to establish private insurance markets through 
forward trading that would substitute for existing 
public price-control mechanisms set in order to protect 
farmers from market price fluctuations. However, the 
development of such commodity futures trade triggers 
price fluctuations through self-reinforcing speculation, 
thus putting the farmers at the mercy of big market 
actors, in particular global seed companies, which 
develop one-stop shop solution businesses providing 
farmers insurance with regard to their yields.89
The development of quasi-integrated 
vertical platforms constitutes a significant 
development in the industry
53.  The development of quasi-integrated vertical 
platforms, through contractual licensing restrictions, 
constitutes a significant development in the industry. 
It has been noted that “the organization of the transgenic 
seed industry has shifted fundamentally over the past 
two decades from separate ownership of agricultural 
biotechnology and seed assets to integrated platforms. 
These platforms comprise three major levels: (1) 
innovation involving genetic transformation technologies 
and genomics; (2) genetic traits that are expressed in plant 
agronomics, including insect resistance (Bt) and herbicide 
tolerance (Ht); and (3) state-of-the-art seeds containing 
genetic traits, for which seed companies are the major 
distribution channel for ultimate sales to farmers. Most 
current-generation transgenic seeds contain multiple or 
ʻstacked genetic trait.’”90
54.  These seed platforms may be established 
for benign reasons, for instance the prospect of 
economies of coordination that potentially arise from 
complementarities between complex research and 
development. However, seed platforms may also result 
from a strategy to create or enhance market power 
through control of patented technology and distribution 
channels for delivering transgenic seeds to farmers.91 
This has occurred partly because of the expansion of IP 
rights in this sector, as instead of negotiating for the rights 
to a competitor’s technology, it was simpler, cheaper, or 
more advantageous to acquire the competitor outright. 
89 J. Ghosh, The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance, (2010) Journal 
of Agrarian Change 10 (1) 72–86.
90 D. L. Moss, Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place? (23 October 2009) AAI Submission, p. 2.
91 Ibid. Ce
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A variety of competition models 
characterizes the industry
55.  There is also a variety of competition models 
characterizing the industry. As it is reported by Diana 
Moss, “two non-mutually exclusive models of competition 
characterize rivalry in transgenic seed--inter-platform and 
intra-platform competition. In the first case, rivalry is 
between transgenic seed platforms. Seed containing traits 
that are exclusive to a single firm are the product of such 
platforms. Intra-platform competition involves rivalry 
within platforms whereby firms develop new transgenic 
seed products, in part, by obtaining access to (…) 
patented traits [within the platform]. (…) What model 
of competition is likely to produce the greatest benefits 
for competition and consumers poses key a question for 
antitrust enforcement.”92 Some have argued that these 
different forms of competition should be reflected in the 
definition of the relevant market, the market for patented 
traits being defined as a separate market than that for 
traited seed, “when those rights are marketed separately 
from the products in which they are used.”93
56.  Firms have the choice to either opt for an open 
system in which different complementary assets (such as 
genetic traits and seed germplasm) interoperate well with 
rival technology, or to develop “closed” platforms. This 
choice involves “fundamental decisions to promote open 
source versus proprietary technologies, ʻplug-and-play’ 
versus non-standardized components, and tactics that are 
designed to frustrate rivals’ access to needed technology.”94 
Competition in this context may occur between platforms 
and within platforms. Competition authorities should 
make efforts to promote inter-platform competition, but 
also intra-platform competition. This is important in view 
of the consolidation of the industry and the significant 
competitive position of some global seeds companies 
which control, through ownership or through a great 
number of cross-licensing or joint-venture agreement, 
large, totally closed platforms in transgenic seed that 
may be challenged only by the unlikely emergence of 
rival platforms. This may lead to single-firm dominance 
and the foreclosure of competitors from the access to 
technology that is critical for intra-platform competition. 
Diana Moss explains that as the dominant player in the 
market for genetic trait, Monsanto acquired numerous 
independent seed companies between the mid-1990s to 
late 2000s, beefing up its presence in downstream markets 
for traited seed with the effect that it has been able to 
create vertically integrated platforms of genetic traits 
and traited seed. In order to stack traits, a developer 
must combine its own traits with those of Monsanto or 
another rival. In view of Monsanto’s important share in 
genetic traits, the number of possible traits combinations 
that could be created between non-Monsanto developers 
92 Ibid., p. 12.
93 D. Lim, Living with Monsanto, (2015) Michigan State Law Review 559, 649, 
also noting that high production costs and technological “irrelevance” may 
not make conventional or organic seeds substitutable to traited seeds.
94 Ibid., p. 12.
is limited, with the result that the majority of stacked trait 
combinations contain a Monsanto trait.95 The possibility 
of generic competition in transgenic seed, following 
the end of some Monsanto patents, is also limited, 
without the development of an institutional structure 
for promoting and managing generic competition 
and incentives for the dominant player in this market 
to facilitate the development of generic products.96 
According to Diana Moss, “(a) myriad of adverse effects 
potentially flow from this, including reduced or lower quality 
innovation in transgenic seed, higher seed prices to farmers 
(i.e., ʻtechnology fees’), fewer transgenic seed choices, and 
higher commodity prices than what would have prevailed 
under competitive market conditions.”97 A combination 
of a more active competition law enforcement ex ante 
(through merger control) as well as ex post (abuse of 
dominance, anticompetitive agreements) in this sector 
and more government funding for research might promote 
alternative platforms. Furthermore, the development of 
global commons for germ plasm and traits may further 
develop innovation, while promoting a more competitive 
market structure.98
57.  Finally, one may add the transformation of 
farmers from risk-taking entrepreneurs that dispose 
of importance incentives to innovate to agents, or simply 
labor, for seed companies, receiving fixed compensation 
and not incurring any significant risks. This reduces the 
overall incentives to innovate of a significant number 
of economic operators in this economic sector and 
eventually limiting the possibility of applying antitrust 
law provisions to these vertical relations. Farmers and seed 
companies may be considered, in some circumstances, 
forming a “single undertaking,” for instance when seed 
companies hold ownership of the product with the 
producer under contract.
95 D. Lim, Living with Monsanto, (2015) Michigan State Law Review 559, 636, 
notes that Monsanto’s Roundup Ready technology “has become an industry 
standard or de facto standard essential patent,” opening the possibility of 
compulsory access to the Roundup Ready under either the essential facilities 
doctrine or the patent misuse doctrine.
96 D. L. Moss, Transgenic Seed: The High Technology Test for Antitrust? 
(Spring 2010) Competition Policy International, 10(2).
97 D. L. Moss, Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place? (23 October 2009) AAI Submission, p. 12. 
98 On the need and strategies to develop global commons for germ plasm and 
traits, see inter alia M. Halewood, I. Lόpez Noriega and S. Louafi (eds.), Crop 
Genetic Resources as a Global Commons (Routledge, 2013); W.P. Falcon and 
C. Fowler, Carving up the commons—emergence of a new international regime 
for germplasm development and transfer, (2002) 27 Food Policy 197–222. 
Possible solutions may be inspired by the emergence of global commons for 
other natural resources, such as microbial commons: see, T. Dedeurwaerdere, 
Global microbial commons: institutional challenges for the global exchange 
and distribution of microorganisms in the life sciences, (2010) 161 Research 
in Microbiology 414–421; E. Brousseau, T. Dedeurwaerdere, P.-A. Jouvet 
and M. Willinger (eds.), Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and 
Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms (Oxford University 
Press, 2012). This trend towards the formation of global commons will 
become even more pronounced following the implementation of the Nagoya 
protocol on Access to Genetic Resources, a supplementary agreement to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 2010 (and which entered into 
force in 2014). See, T. Dedeurwaerdere, P. Melindi-Ghidi & A. Broggiato, 
Global scientific research commons under the Nagoya Protocol: Towards a 
collaborative economy model for the sharing of basic research assets, (2016) 
55(1) Environmental Science & Policy 1–10. Ce
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2. Farmers: Antitrust’s fallen 
heroes?
58.  It is not yet clear whether such level of penetration 
into the typical farming business is sustainable for farmers 
as independent economic entities. Considering the 
recent trend of global agrochemical players to build IT-
platforms to sell decision-making services to farmers, as 
complements to their already existing product portfolios, 
these companies will have access to information that 
has never been collected and shared before. The farmer 
becomes critically dependent on the product mix from 
a single provider or a limited number of providers. This 
may result in a shrinking choice for farmers of seeds 
cultivars. A recent study by Hilbeck et al. of farmers’ 
choice of seeds in four EU countries, with different levels 
of GM crop adoption, showed that in Spain, which has 
adopted GM maize, the seed market appeared to be more 
concentrated with fewer differentiated cultivars.99 
59.  Another study conducted by Benbrook found that 
contrary to the argument of biotech crop proponents 
that genetically engineered crops reduce pesticides use, 
“the spread of glyphosate-resistant weeds in herbicide-
resistant weed management systems has brought about 
substantial increases in the number and volume of 
herbicides applied.”100 The study documented that farmers 
had to increase pesticides use in the United States over 
the period of 1996–2011 by 7% (equivalent of roughly 
183 million kgs).
60.  In some sense, farming as an industry becomes 
increasingly “commoditisized,” meaning that farmers are 
finding themselves outsourcing more and more critical 
inputs (i.e., seeds) and decisions (through IT decision-
support systems) to global agriculture solutions providers. 
The farmer’s only value added is his labor by which we 
mean actual efforts spent on growing the harvest. The 
farmers are increasingly losing control of seed materials 
(this decision in turn defines the mix of crop protection 
products and other inputs), and very soon they will 
outsource other decision-making capabilities. In the long 
run, to stay competitive farmers will be forced to use high 
quality seeds supplied to them from a limited number of 
global players and an associated array of complementary 
products to these seeds from the same number of 
providers. Also, they will be using relatively the same 
agriculture machinery from the other limited group of 
global equipment providers such as John Deere, CNH, 
AGCO, Claas, etc. Farmers’ labor commoditization 
means that the only available choice to compete will be 
cost reduction. As a result, one might expect a further 
trend of small and mid-sized farmers to exit the market, 
further expansion of the big farms and vertically 
integrated agriculture holdings. In some countries where 
99 A. Hilbeck et al., Farmer’s choice of seeds in four EU countries under 
different levels of GM crop adoption, (2013) 25(1) Environmental Sciences 
Europe 12, available at http://www.enveurope.com/content/25/1/12. 
100 C. M. Benbrook, Impacts of genetically engineered crops on pesticide 
use in the U.S. – the first sixteen years, (2012) 24 Environmental Sciences 
Europe 24, available at http://www.enveurope.com/content/24/1/24. 
agriculture industry to a significant extent consists of 
small and mid-sized farmers—i.e., India, Brazil, China, 
selected Latin-American and African countries—this 
may be a rather painful process. 
At the expense of the farming industry 
consumers will probably benefit from 
these trends by getting agriculture products 
at cheaper prices
61.  Ultimately, consumers will probably benefit from 
these trends by getting agriculture products at cheaper 
prices. However, this will be largely at the expense of the 
farming industry. One may also argue that a measure 
of consumers’ welfare should also include a quality 
dimension, in particular also sustainability and quality 
of food (in terms of nutrient value), or that, at least in 
order to include these dimensions in competition law 
and policy, mergers (and at least horizontal cooperation 
agreements) in the food sector should be assessed under 
broader public interest standards.
62.  Ironically, the interests of farmers and consumers 
were considered as largely compatible in the formative 
years of the Sherman Act. The role of the Granger 
movement and their revolt against the monopoly power 
of railways in the passage of the Sherman Act has long 
being highlighted.101 Some agricultural cooperatives 
were excluded from the scope of the Sherman Act with 
Section  6 of the Clayton Act  1914, the same article 
providing an exemption for labor unions. According to 
this article, the antitrust laws should not be construed 
to prohibit the existence and operation of agricultural 
organizations instituted for purposes of mutual help 
and allowing individual members of such organizations 
to carry out these “legitimate objects,” the “labor of a 
human being (…) not [being] a commodity or article of 
commerce.” Passed in 1922, the Copper-Volstead Act 
further provides for an exemption from antitrust liability 
to allow farmers to join together on collectively marketing 
or processing commodities they produce. The statute is 
implemented by the USDA, which may file complaints 
against cooperatives that engage in a monopoly or 
restriction of trade to such an extent that the price of 
the commodity is “unduly enhanced”.102 Christine Varney 
observed how “the Capper-Volstead Act’s proponents 
viewed cooperatives as a bulwark against ‘middlemen’ 
and ‘speculators’ that unfairly preyed on both farmers and 
consumers,” these firms “collecting [their] tribute from 
both the farmer and the consumer.”103 The scope of the 
exemption was, however, narrowly construed by U.S. 
101 H. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1955), 
p. 143. See, however, the criticism on the influence of the agrarian movement in the 
passage of the Sherman Act by George Stigler, The Origins of the Sherman Act, 
(August 1983) Working Paper No. 27, available at http://www.chicagobooth.edu/ 
assests/stigler/27.pdf.
102 7 USC §§ 291–292.
103 C. Varney, The Capper-Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives, and 
Antitrust Immunity, (2010) The Antitrust Source 1–9, pp. 2–3. Ce
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courts.104 EU competition law also includes derogations 
for producer organizations, on the basis of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) provisions of the EU Treaties 
and related secondary legislation.105 It is worthy of note 
that the extent of such specific regimes of immunity for 
agricultural cooperatives has been expanding in the EU 
while it has been shrinking in the U.S. It is remarkable 
that these exemptions aim to protect farmers from the 
superior bargaining power of retailers downstream.106 
The recent draft Commission guidelines on the specific 
competition rules for common market organizations 
(including agricultural cooperatives) active, for instance, 
in the arable crop sector, omit any reference to the 
important power exercised by the upstream input of 
production suppliers, in particular global seed companies.
“Competition law regimes should be 
improved to comport with general human 
rights principles of equality and 
non-discrimination, and to facilitate 
the realization of human rights, 
including among others the right to food”
63. From a political economy perspective, it may make 
sense for emergent and developing jurisdictions to take 
into account the inter-country distribution of the total 
surplus value of the global food value chain when 
designing their competition law interventions in this 
area. The high concentration in food supply chains, in 
particular in the factors of production level including 
seeds, and the bargaining power that ensues have been 
examined by a briefing note of the UN special rapporteur 
on the right to food, which is of particular interest for 
our study in view of the emphasis put on the “direct 
link between the ability of competition regimes to address 
abuses of buyer power in supply chains and the enjoyment 
of the right to adequate food.”107 The report highlights 
concerns over the strategies of input suppliers and their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis farmers. Faced with a reality 
of decreasing revenues, small farmers are pressed to 
produce even more agricultural commodities in order 
to earn short-term income in an attempt to meet daily 
expenses, which leads to oversupply and the vicious circle 
of further depression of prices, sometimes even below 
the average cost of production. This has particularly 
devastating consequences in the developing world and 
104 See, Christine Varney, P. Carstensen, Agricultural Cooperatives and the 
Law: Obsolete Statutes in a Dynamic Economy, (2013) 58 South Dakota Law 
Review 462–498; J. M. Connor, Antitrust Developments in Food and Pharma, 
(February 2015), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616799 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2616799.
105 See Articles 169, 170 and 171 of the CMO Regulation and the recent Draft 
Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Application of the Specific Rules Set out 
in Articles 169, 170 and 181 of the CMO Regulation for the olive oil, beef and veal 
and arable crops sectors, (2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
consultations/2015_cmo_regulation/draft_guidelines%20_en.pdf.
106 See, I. Lianos and C. Lombardi, Superior bargaining power and the global 
food value chain, study in Concurrences No. 1-2016
107 O. de Schutter, Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains. The 
Role of Competition Law in Tackling the Abuse of Buyer Power, (December 
2010) Briefing Note 03, available at http://www.srfood.org/en/briefing-note-
addressing-concentration-in-food-supply-chains, p. 1.
emerging economies, these effects not being alleviated 
through a high level of state subsidies, as it is the case in 
Europe, for instance. The special rapporteur recommends 
that “competition law regimes should be improved to 
comport with general human rights principles of equality 
and non-discrimination, and to facilitate the realization of 
human rights, including among others the right to food, the 
right to work, and the right to development.”108 
64. More concretely, this implies that countries exporting 
agricultural commodities should not adopt “competition laws 
focused on consumer welfare on the model proposed by the 
OECD,” but should instead seek to “ensure that, in the competition 
law regime that they set up, they offer a sufficient high level of protection 
of their producers against abuses of dominant positions by commodity 
buyers, food processors or retailers, as part of their obligation to protect 
the right to food under their jurisdiction.”109 For the special rapporteur, 
“substantive competition laws should recognize that consumer harms 
arising from excessive buyer concentration are incipient and therefore 
indeterminate in character, but that this indeterminacy should not be a 
reason for failing to control such conduct,” a “more enriched conception 
of consumer welfare” being needed, “one that takes account of 
consumers’ interests in sustainability—rather than focusing purely 
upon short-term price changes.”110 In view of the inability of major 
developed countries competition authorities to control excessive 
buyer power, because of the remoteness of the effects of such power 
on their consumers, according to the effects doctrine,111 developing 
108 Ibid., p. 4.
109 Ibid., p. 5.
110 Ibid.
111 The rapporteur notes that Section 6(a) of the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (FTAIA) provides that jurisdiction of the US Sherman Act 
can be established only where extraterritorial conduct has “direct, substantial 
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on trade or commerce in the US, these 
concepts being interpreted restrictively by the US courts. Hence, conduct 
by large buyers that has remote effects on consumers may escape the scope 
of the Sherman Act. He gives the example of a 9th Circuit court of appeals 
case in U.S. v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 1945), in which 
the defendant, a US corporation, had imposed a foreign supplier-developer 
of tomato seeds, a contractual clause preventing it from supplying any other 
buyer in the U.S. According to the US DOJ, Antitrust Division, such clause 
would have made less likely innovations from the foreign supplier-developer 
in the creation of heartier tomato seeds that would have allowed consumers to 
enjoy higher quality, better tasting winter tomatoes. The judge dismissed these 
arguments noting that the “delay of possible innovations does not have a direct 
effect on American commerce.” The special rapporteur notes that the EU effects 
doctrine may catch this type of behavior as the EU courts have interpreted 
the requirement of the immediate and substantial effect in the EU broadly “to 
pertain not so much to economic effects, but to the structure of the market.” 
With regard to the US, it is well known that the 9th circuit in earlier cases had 
adopted a strict standard for directness of the effect on American commerce, 
as the effect must follow from “an immediate consequence of the defendant’s 
activity.” U.S. v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004). In 2012, 
the Seventh Circuit took a different approach in Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 
683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012), where it introduced the “reasonably proximate 
causal nexus” standard, which enables a more expansive interpretation of 
Section 6(a) of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA). 
This more expansive view was confirmed in the recent Motorola II judgment 
of the Seventh Circuit, Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp., 773 F.3d 826 
(7th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745 (U.S. March 16, 
2015), where the Seventh Circuit revisited a more restrictive interpretation of 
Section 6(a). In Motorola I, Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 
F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014), the Court rejected the existence of a “direct” effect 
on U.S. commerce because of the fact that the anti-competitive behavior was 
affecting intermediary and not final products. The Second Circuit also adopted 
the more expansive “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard in Lotes 
Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014) (conduct was 
considered as within the scope even if it affected intermediary products). In a 
recent judgment the 9th Circuit nevertheless insisted on the restrictive approach 
of “the immediate consequence test,” U.S. v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 
2015), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745 (U.S. March 16, 2015). Ce
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jurisdictions, in which the majority of impoverished farmers are 
located, should set up “credible competition authorities of their 
own.” The special rapporteur concludes that “developed 
countries, especially those where dominant agribusiness 
buyers are domiciled, should be more active in addressing 
the creation, maintenance and abuse of such buyer power, 
with a view not only to protecting the suppliers, particularly 
in developing countries, from the impacts of abuses of 
dominant positions, but also to ensuring the longer term 
stability of supply for consumers. Developing countries 
where food insecurity is widespread in the rural areas and 
where violations of the right to adequate food of small-
scale farmers are common, may wish to create competition 
regimes that impose on buyers specific duties, or subject 
them to specific types of control, in certain supply chains 
or for certain commodities that are particularly important 
to the revenues of small-scale farmers, with a view to 
preventing types of conduct which result in harms to the 
welfare of producers.”112
VI. Conclusion
65. The rising levels of consolidation of the seeds market 
globally, because of the expansive M&A strategies of the 
various players and the dense network of cross-licensing 
arrangements and IP pools, leads to the emergence of a 
tighter oligopoly in this important segment of the global 
food value chain. This may raise interesting issues as 
to the need of such consolidation for a more intensive 
R&D effort, and more generally, on the allocation of 
the total surplus among the various segments of the 
global food value chain. At the same time, farmers 
relinquish functions, such as risk management, in favor 
of integrators, thus leading to an informal quasi-vertical 
integration at the global scale of the production segment 
of the global food value chain, which also has broader 
social implications that are not usually examined in 
competition law assessment. 
66. One may advocate the consideration of value chains, 
or more generally the overall value of transactions113 
in assessing the thresholds for merger control, as the 
turnover of past business years does not necessarily 
represent the competitive significance of the transaction, 
in terms of the likely reduction of potential competition. 
It is also possible to think of assessing mergers and other 
transactions leading to consolidation of the seeds market 
from a public interest perspective, in view of the broader 
concerns animating public policy in this context and the 
existence of a nexus of international commitments as 
112 O. de Schutter, Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains, 
(December 2010) Briefing Note 03, p. 6. 
113 This type of threshold has also been suggested for the review of mergers 
in digital markets that present similar problems of under-inclusiveness for 
the current turnover thresholds, in view of the highly evolving nature of 
this market and the impact of merger activity on potential competition. See, 
Monopolkommission, Wettbewerbspolitik: Herausforderung digitale Märkte, 
Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB 
(June 2015), available at http://www.monopolkommission.de/index.php/de/
homepage/84-pressemitteilungen/286-wettbewerbspolitik-herausforderung-
digitale-maerkte.
to biodiversity, sustainability, the right to food, etc.114 
The role of public authorities, including competition 
authorities, in supporting the development of commons 
for germplasm and traits, as well as in putting in place 
a vibrant generic biotech crops market, constitute 
additional strategies in order to open up access to the 
seeds market and loosen the pressure input suppliers, in 
particular global seed companies, exercise on farmer’s 
revenues. This raises important questions as to the 
sociological categories protected by competition law 
(consumers, farmers, small & medium undertakings), and 
the explicit consideration of the distributive implications 
of competition law enforcement, also at the level of a 
specific jurisdiction. Although there is important work 
on the effects of IP rights and IP strategies on innovation 
in agricultural biotechnology, there is little analysis over 
the distribution of the value brought by the innovations 
introduced throughout the various segments (and actors) 
of the food value chain.115
67.  Concerns over inequality and the role competition 
law may play in this context116 may justify claims 
for a “fairer” distribution of the total surplus value 
resulting from innovation, and for an increasing focus 
of competition law enforcement on the way the total 
value is allocated between the various segments of the 
114 Biological diversity is protected at the international level by the Convention 
on Biological Diversity adopted in 1992. The aim to guarantee a fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources is further 
implemented by the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources, 
a supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
adopted in 2010 (and which entered into force in 2014). The Nagoya 
Protocol sets out core obligations for States contracting parties, including 
domestic-level access measures with the aim to create conditions to 
promote and encourage research contributing to biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable use and benefit-sharing obligations for the benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources as well as subsequent applications 
and commercialization, subject to mutually agreed terms (monetary or non-
monetary). According to the Protocol, “(e)ach Party shall take legislative, 
administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, with the aim of ensuring 
that benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources that are held by 
indigenous and local communities, in accordance with domestic legislation 
regarding the established rights of these indigenous and local communities 
over these genetic resources, are shared in a fair and equitable way with 
the communities concerned, based on mutually agreed terms” (Article 5 
of the Nagoya Protocol). Legal obligations arising out of environmental 
protection laws and sustainability norms included in international treaties and 
national constitutions also frame public action relating to the preservation 
of competition in the context of the food value chain. For instance, the EU 
treaties include a general integration clause at Article 7 TFEU, according to 
which “(t)he Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, 
taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle 
of conferral of powers.” Sustainable development constitutes a fundamental 
objective pursued by the European Union, according to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
With regard to environmental protection, Article 11 TFEU provides that “(e)
nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities.” The inclusion 
of these provisions will inevitably lead the Commission and arguably the 
Courts to grant more importance to broader public interest concerns in some 
circumstances. See, I. Lianos, Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals 
of EU Competition Law, in I. Lianos and D. Geradin (eds.), Handbook in EU 
Competition Law: Substantive Aspects, (Edward Elgar, 2013), 1-84.
115 Of particular interest may be some recent studies on the distribution of 
financial value from innovation in the global supply chains of iPods and 
notebook computers and the role of bargaining power in this context. See, 
J. Dedrick, Who profits from innovation in global value chains?: a study of 
the iPod and notebook PCs, (2010) 19(1) Industrial and Corporate Change, 
81–116.
116 A. Atkinson, Inequality: What can be done? (Harvard University Press, 
2015), in particular his Proposal 2(a) that “Public policy should aim at a 
proper balance of power among stakeholders, and to this end should (a) 
introduce an explicitly distributional dimension into competition policy (…)” Ce
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chain, but also among the various jurisdictions in which 
economic actors are involved in this value creation. These 
important challenges may justify the rethinking of some 
of the core concepts of competition law enforcement 
and the rehabilitation of concepts that have been long 
excluded from mainstream antitrust law jargon, following 
the shift from the era of populist antitrust to the current 
neoclassical price theory driven theoretical framework.117 
This may prove crucial for developing jurisdictions that 
are concerned by the way they may maintain or improve 
(“upgrade”) their position in the various global value 
chains.118 n
117 For instance, one may think of the need to rehabilitate the concept of superior 
bargaining power, or more generally, relational market power, although not 
the populist antitrust version of it, but one that may rely on recent economic 
thinking, including non-cooperative game theory, behavioral economics, etc. 
For a discussion, see I. Lianos and C. Lombardi, Superior bargaining power 
and the global food value chain: The wuthering heights of holistic competition 
law?, Concurrences No. 1–2016, pp. 22–35.
118 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Global Value 
Chains and Development: Investment and Value Added Trade in the Global 
Economy, UN Doc UNCTAD/DIAE/2013/1 (2013). Ce
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